Archive

Tag Archives: Regulation

This paper examines corporate interests in the evolution of the Internet, arguing that the Internet is not a neutral configuration of technologies. In reviewing the state’s role in regulating the Internet, the paradoxical alliance between the neoliberal economic and political agenda and advocacy of an open unregulated Internet is highlighted. Evidence of neoliberal strategies in telecommunication, broadcasting and the Internet is considered alongside private sector interests in exploiting labour power, in managing information diversity and in creating new choke points on the Internet. In the cases of infrastructure investment, content production and radio spectrum policy the continuing primacy of market valuation suggests that the neoliberal paradigm is influencing whether the state seeks to regulate indicating that there is a need for pro-active policy and regulatory intervention to secure the Internet as a communicative space for an engaged citizenry.

Consultation Paper on Issues relating to Media Ownership in India: Written comments on the consultation paper are invited from the stakeholders by 8th March 2013 and countercomments, if any, by 15th March 2013.

One of the most consistent observations made by economists of government regulation has been the seemingly inevitable phenomenon of “regulatory capture” (Dal Bó, 2006; Kahn, 1971; Laffont & Tirole, 1991; Levine & Forrence, 1990; Mitnick,1980; Stigler, 1971; Wu, 2010). According to Horwitz (1989), this occurs when a regulatory agency “systematically favors the private interests of regulated parties and systematically ignores the public interest” (emphasis in original, p. 29). The public interest thus becomes “perverted” as a regulator matures through several phases. “As the agency hits old age, it becomes a bureaucratic morass which, because of precedent, serves to protect its industry” (Horwitz, 1989, p. 30). Fraser (2000) used the same analogy of life stages to explain regulatory capture:

In their infancy, regulators show youthful activism. By middle age, they have succumbed to subtle co-option by industry interests. In their final stages of bureaucratic senility, they degenerate into passive interests of the corporate interest under their purview. (p. D11)

By that description, he added, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) provided an excellent example of regulatory capture.

Marc Edge, in the latest Canadian Journal of Communication.

One of the most consistent observations made by economists of government regulation has been the seemingly inevitable phenomenon of “regulatory capture” (Dal Bó, 2006; Kahn, 1971; Laffont & Tirole, 1991; Levine & Forrence, 1990; Mitnick,1980; Stigler, 1971; Wu, 2010). According to Horwitz (1989), this occurs when a regulatory agency “systematically favors the private interests of regulated parties and systematically ignores the public interest” (emphasis in original, p. 29). The public interest thus becomes “perverted” as a regulator matures through several phases. “As the agency hits old age, it becomes a bureaucratic morass which, because of precedent, serves to protect its industry” (Horwitz, 1989, p. 30). Fraser (2000) used the same analogy of life stages to explain regulatory capture:

In their infancy, regulators show youthful activism. By middle age, they have succumbed to subtle co-option by industry interests. In their final stages of bureaucratic senility, they degenerate into passive interests of the corporate interest under their purview. (p. D11)

By that description, he added, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) provided an excellent example of regulatory capture.

Marc Edge, in the latest Canadian Journal of Communication.